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  Mickaella Perina
Abstract
This essay examines the links between aesthetics and race
through the lenses of accepted distinctions between Western
and non-Western, colonial and postcolonial, national and
transnational aesthetics, and questions the validity of the claim
that there is an inherent and incommensurable difficulty in
translating non-Western aesthetic thought into Western
aesthetic thought. First, I argue that Manichean models are
insufficient to understand the dynamics of the encounter
between Western and non-Western aesthetics. Second, I
illustrate the complexity of non-Western and Western
aesthetics relations through the example of the encounter
between Aimé Césaire’s Negritude and André Breton’s
surrealism. I argue that this encounter exemplifies non-ideal
translation, the temporary rendering from one framework into
the other, and instantiates relationality. Third, I argue that it
is possible to understand and accommodate various aesthetic
experiences and different aesthetic frameworks by exploring
modes of discerning between different kinds of others and
different kinds of selves, and that cosmopolitanism could, but
does not, provide the necessary conditions for such reversal.
Key Words
Césaire, colonial aesthetics, cosmopolitanism, negritude,
postcolonial aesthetics, race relationality, surrealism, transnationalism

1. Introduction
Historically regarded as a branch of philosophy dealing
essentially with the nature of beauty, art, and taste, aesthetics
has evolved to encompass a variety of concerns that are
interdisciplinary in nature, but racialization [1] is far from
being systematically debated. In this article I seek to specify
the meaning of encountering Otherness within the realm of
aesthetics. I examine how race and aesthetics have been
historically interrelated within a network of political, social, and
ethical concerns, and how issues of taste are related to culture
and to race.
It is my contention that in today’s cosmopolitan, transnational
world, race, aesthetics, and otherness must be understood as
interconnected. In our global era I see an inflation of
otherness, a rise of the quality of being different and excluded
from the making of standards, values, and judgments,
including aesthetic standards. Ways of establishing a
demarcation line between self and other, between ours and
theirs may vary, but the tendency to regard the Other as a
stranger and his or her culture as fundamentally foreign
remains a constant. Furthermore, the tendency to reject
otherness by projecting it exclusively onto outsiders, and to
refuse to acknowledge ourselves as others, appears invariable.
Before being able to draw any conclusion, this essay will first
examine the links between non-Western aesthetics, both

colonial and national aesthetics, and race while questioning the
validity of the claim that there is an inherent difficulty in
translating non-Western aesthetics thought into Western
thought. Second, the essay continues with an illustration of the
complexity of the relation between non-Western and Western
aesthetics through the example of the encounter between
Aimé Césaire’s Negritude poetry and André Breton’s
surrealism. Third, I argue that it is possible to understand and
accommodate our experience of otherness, and to explore
modes of distinguishing between different kinds of others and
different kinds of selves and of discerning how they relate to
each other. Cosmopolitanism can provide conditions for such a
reversal. I insist, however, that cosmopolitanism can also
create the conditions for new racial categories, and I explore
how the discourse of cosmopolitanism shapes questions of
aesthetics without eliminating the pervasiveness of racism.
2. Western and non-Western Aesthetics: Does Race
Matter?
“And in vain I swallow seven mouthfuls of water
Three or four times in every twenty-four hours
My childhood returns to me
In a hiccup shaking
My instinct
Like a cop shaking a hooligan
Disaster
Tell me about disaster
Tell me about it
…
I understand that once again
You missed your vi-o-lin lesson
A banjo
You said
A banjo
No sir
You must know that we do not allow in this house
Nor ban
Nor jo
Nor gui
Nor tar
Mulattos don’t do that
Leave that for black people”
Léon Gontran Dama, Pigments, “Hiccup”

I find it useful to start my inquiry with a quotation from
“Hiccup” (Hocquet), a famous poem by Léon-Gontran Damas
(one of the founders of the Negritude movement). [2] This
poem is, in my view, an example of a non-Western literary
work that expresses a network of political, social, ethical, and
aesthetic concerns determined by race and colonialism. In this
poem—published in 1937 and compared by Césaire to Sartre’s
Nausea—Léon-Gontran Damas criticizes cultural assimilation
and, with irony, describes both a mother’s snobbism through
her various attempts to make a young boy develop a taste for
Western culture and the boy’s resistance. The mother’s efforts
manifest a specific conception of beauty and taste, a particular
understanding of what should be pleasing to her son’s senses
on the basis of his racial and social identity.
Beyond the question of beauty and taste, this poem and the
mother-son relationship it describes speak of the relation
between different and hierarchically ordered cultures—Western
and non-Western—within a French colonial context. In this
poem Damas articulates his grief regarding the “disaster” of
racism and the taboo of interracial relationships. He also
articulates the shaping of identities—including his own—and
the formation of knowledge. I see constructions of identity and
geopolitics of knowledge as strongly connected and I try, as
Enrique Dussel does, to take the “geopolitical space seriously.”
[3] I also think Walter Mignolo is right to argue that
“knowledge is always geo-historically and geo-politically
located across the epistemic colonial difference.” [4] In my
view Damas articulates how, in the context of a French colonial
society, legitimate knowledge—encompassing both value and
purpose—is measured against Western (French) standards,
and how identities are shaped by such dynamics. In a strict
historical perspective, non-Western poetry, such as Damas’s,
can be understood as part of colonial aesthetics, namely
aesthetics produced under colonial rule, as opposed to
‘national or postcolonial aesthetics’ produced after the end of
colonial rule and regarded as authentic and considered likely
to be immune to racism. In such a historical perspective both
colonial and postcolonial aesthetics are defined as nonWestern.
One way to think about non-Western aesthetics is to regard it
as a colonial invention. [5]Following the “colonial encounter,”
[6] “non-Western aesthetics” are defined as opposed to
Western-aesthetics, which are aesthetics par excellence. In
this sense the phrase “non-Western aesthetics” refers to the
Other of Western aesthetics and designates, I would argue,
not only what is simply not the same but what is different in a
threatening or disturbing way; not only the Other that relates
to another place but the Other that differs in nature or
character to the point of incompatibility. Interestingly enough,
while distinguishing between two different aesthetics, such
categorization also expresses what precisely makes the
categorization possible, namely the encounter itself, the
coming together. But the use of the category assumes that
there is an object —non-Western aesthetics—that is different
in nature from Western aesthetics and does not account for
the relation that makes the category possible, that is, the
encounter.

The encounter disturbs the canon of Western aesthetics and
new categories such as “Western” and “non-Western
aesthetics” are created to communicate the difference without
accounting for comparisons, associations, and contrasts. As
Gene Blocker rightly noted, “The first thing we must realize in
this undertaking is that the world does not come conveniently
prepackaged for us into neat compartments of “Chinese
aesthetics,” “Indian Aesthetics,” “African Aesthetics,”
“Polynesian aesthetics,” “Native American Aesthetics,” and so
on. Any discussion of non-Western Aesthetics must be (and
can only be) a cross-cultural comparison.” [7]This crosscultural comparison echoes what I called relation above. Our
understanding of Western and non-Western aesthetics
depends upon our ability to think across boundaries and
requires willingness to first acknowledge and exhibit the links,
and second to attempt to understand them.
I am not suggesting here that the debate about non-Western
aesthetics is to be limited to the encounter with Western
aesthetics; it certainly also exhibits tensions within colonial
and postcolonial societies between colonial non-Western
aesthetics and national/postcolonial non-Western aesthetics.
However, I argue that there are two levels of analysis. The
first level pertains to the encounter and what it produces,
namely a discourse about another aesthetics regarded as the
other of aesthetics, as well as practices generated in response
to the encounter and the discourse. The second level of
analysis pertains to the various aesthetic productions and
practices that are not determined by the encounter but exist in
parallel and can go unnoticed by the dominant discourse. My
contention is that these two levels are not to be considered
historically as successively ordered. There are arguably
authentic Indian, African, Polynesian, Caribbean, Native
American aesthetics (the list being necessarily non-exhaustive)
but I want to suggest that being postcolonial is not a sufficient
condition for the authenticity of these aesthetics as much as
being colonial is not a sufficient condition for their
inauthenticity. Taking seriously the two levels of analysis is of
special interest to the author of this article because by
examining them carefully we can make visible relations with
an “Other within” in ways that are left out by the binary
Western/non-Western, and which therefore invite the
examination of relations and negotiations between individuals
and communities both locally and globally.
It has been argued that “colonial aesthetics” and particularly
colonial literary work ought to be regarded as organized
chronologically. Fanon, for instance, describes three phases:
“In the first phase, the native intellectual gives proof that he
has assimilated the culture of the occupying power. This is the
period of unqualified assimilation…. In the second phase we
find the native is disturbed; he decides to remember what he
is…. Finally in the third phase, which is called the fighting
phase, the native, after having tried to lose himself in the
people and with the people, will on the contrary shake the
people.” [8]
This position is not atypical. In fact, as Welleck and Warren
have argued, most histories of literature have arranged
literary works “in more or less chronological order.” [9]
Applied to colonial literature and in particular to Caribbean

literature, such fixed literary phases produce a periodization
determined by ideologies where authenticity and commitment
are necessarily associated with national aesthetics and the
postcolonial era, while mimicking and assimilation are related
to colonial time. On this reading colonial aesthetics—including
literary works such as Damas’s “Hiccup” cited at the beginning
of this section—is articulated in reaction to racism and to racial
relationships under colonial rule, and is regarded as a
historical period that will—immediately or ultimately—be
followed by a period of authentic national or postcolonial
aesthetics necessarily exempt of racism. It is my contention
that such periodicity does not account for the various and
complex relationships between individuals and communities or
with the variety of configurations of power. Taking the various
forms of negotiations with and resistance to the norms of
Western aesthetics seriously, I argue that colonial aesthetics
needs not be regarded as necessarily disingenuous and that
authentic national and postcolonial aesthetics not only are not
immune of racism but also are often racialized.
As Michael Dash pointed out in the case of modern literary
history “Such rigorously applied periods do not take into
account the possibility of simultaneity, coexistence or
crosscurrents that indicate that the individual imagination
cannot be fixed in terms of a neat diachronic model. For
instance, it is not all that difficult to demonstrate that
authenticity can be a calculated strategy, that apparent
imitativeness can conceal a deep concern with genuine
creativity or that commitment and preciosity can sometimes
be found together.” [10]
To apply a strict model of history composed of successive
periods manifesting some progress of reason in aesthetics is to
ignore the possibility of taking steps back and simply to
discount the possibility for individuals to manifest
disagreement with the supposed project of each period.
Opposed currents coexist in a given period. For instance, the
colonial period can coincide with both “colonial aesthetics”—
characterized by apparent mimicking—and “postcolonial
aesthetics” defined by commitments to authenticity and
genuine creativity. In my view Damas’s “Hiccup” certainly
qualifies as “postcolonial aesthetics” to the extent that Damas
was committed to authenticity and that he demonstrated
genuine creativity. Likewise it seems unreasonable to consider
that a postcolonial period cannot exhibit both postcolonial
aesthetics and colonial aesthetics given the definitions
described above. In addition, I argue that “apparent
imitativeness” can be a form of resistance to norms of
(Western) aesthetics, that imitativeness can be a tool to more
complex ends, and that ‘authenticity’ can be a form of
negotiation. As a result, references to strict periodicity can be
misleading.
“Colonial aesthetics” [11] is at the intersection of aesthetic,
social, political, and racial concerns and in that respect
requires further analysis. It is important to distinguish
between colonialist aesthetics and colonial aesthetics given the
politics of domination, exploitation, and disenfranchisement
involved in colonialism and despite the occasional commonality
of space and time. Colonialist aesthetics is the aesthetics that
promotes colonialism while colonial aesthetics encompasses

aesthetics produced under colonial rule both by the colonizers
and by the colonized. While it is possible to consider both
colonized and colonizer as “colonial subjects,” [12] it remains
essential to insist on the power dynamics between them. It is
crucial to study the links between colonialist and colonial
aesthetics to the extent that such relationships inform the
validity and/or invalidity of representations and meanings
attached to non-Western aesthetics. I will return to this point
at the end of this section.
Although my inquiry in this paper is limited to colonial
aesthetics it is not futile to recall the function of racial
difference in colonialist aesthetics. I side on that issue with
JanMohamed who argued a propos colonialist literature that
We can better understand colonialist discourse …
through an analysis that maps its ideological
function in relation to actual imperialist practices.
Such an examination reveals that any evident
‘ambivalence’ is in fact a product of deliberate, if
at times subconscious, imperialist duplicity,
operating very efficiently through the economy of
its central trope, the Manichean allegory. This
economy in turn, is based on a transformation of
racial difference into moral and even
metaphysical difference. [13]
Here JanMohamed emphasizes how important it is to focus on
the political context and the centrality of the Manichean
allegory in any attempt to critically assess colonialist literature.
JanMohamed rejects Homi Bhabha’s concepts of an
“ambivalence of colonial discourse” and of the “unity of the
colonial subject.” He finds these experiences “inadequately
problematized” and insists on the need to study colonialist
discourse in light of the relation between colonized and
colonizer determined by a “Manichean struggle,” or what
Fanon called a “mutual frame of mind [in which] both
protagonists begin the struggle.” [14] To recognize this
Manichean struggle is to recognize the colonial world as a
divided world where there is no neutral standpoint since every
position is affected in some ways by the colonial system. The
colonial order imposes binary, dualist thinking, and I want to
emphasize here that Fanon did appreciate the centrality of this
Manicheism, even if he should not, in my view, be regarded as
a Manichean philosopher.[15]
For JanMohamed, this relation between colonized and colonizer
cannot be conceptualized as if it happens in a vacuum because
it is determined by the political context. According to him, if
there is ambivalence such ambivalence must be the result of
intentional duplicity on the part of the imperial power. This
position is far from Bhabha’s argument according to which
“[c]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable
Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same but
not quite. Which is to say that the discourse of mimicry is
constructed around an ambivalence.” [16] Indeed, for Bhabha,
“[m]imicry conceals no presence or identity behind its mask: it
is not what Césaire describes as “colonization-thingification”
[17] behind which there stands the essence of the présence
Africaine. The menace of mimicry is its double vision, which in
disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts

authority.” [18] I would not argue against the ‘ambivalence’ of
colonial discourse but I side with JanMohamed that such
ambivalence must be understood in relation to the political
context and its corollary racial difference.
Taking actual aesthetic practices and politics of culture
seriously in relation to the ideological function of colonial and
postcolonial practices can significantly improve our
understanding of aesthetics in general and of the relations
between Western and non-Western aesthetics in particular.
The “Manichean allegory” is a useful tool; it is a prism through
which racial difference has been validated and interpreted.
Fanon and Memmi, among others, used it to symbolize the
colonial experience. Fanon argues that the colonial world is
“[a] world compartmentalized, Manichean and petrified, a
world of statues….A world cocksure of itself, crushing with its
stoniness the backbones of those scarred by the whip.” [19]
Albert Memmi emphasizes that colonialism creates a dualism
between the colonized and the colonizer where understanding
the parts becomes a necessary condition of understanding the
whole. [20] But I think it is important to also emphasize that
this allegory has its limits; it cannot account for the variety of
possible relations between the two ‘opposites’ or the diversity
of positions on the part of colonized subjects forced to reinvent
their positions.
In my view, Memmi’s portraits of the colonized and of the
colonizer, while useful, do not account for this diversity and
are not sufficient to think about resistance, ambiguity, or
multiplicity on the part of the colonized. Agency and creativity
under oppression are not central to Memmi’s analysis and his
dualism does not require thinking the possible variations of the
roles or the influence of other factors on the two opposites. It
is my contention that thinking these variants is a necessary
condition for understanding the colonized, the colonizer, and
their various encounters and that race plays an important role
in defining what counts as a significant variant and what does
not.
Focusing on race within the web of relations between colonial,
postcolonial, and Western aesthetics, I will now examine the
idea of indigenous non-Western aesthetics in relation to
Western aesthetics and analyze the value of discussing
European colonial aesthetics of race in relation to racialized
postcolonial aesthetics. Here I must repeat that I depart from
the idea of a unity of the colonial subject and recognize the
diversity within non-Western aesthetics as well as the diversity
of forms of colonization. However, I would argue that despite
this diversity, a case can be made for an analysis of the
relationships between Western and non-Western aesthetics
that integrates an assessment of the concept of race.
Non-Western aesthetics can be regarded as a ‘colonial
invention’ and it can be argued, as Blocker does, that
“[b]ecause of the history of European military, scientific and
economic domination of the world since the seventeenth
century, it has been primarily Europeans who initiated the
discussion using their intellectual framework to analyze and
judge non-Western thought systems.” [21] But the ontological
question has been progressively replaced by a pragmatic one
and the question is no longer whether or not “non-Western

aesthetics” exists—or even what such an object would be if it
was to exist—but whether or not it is desirable to create it.
Blocker, for instance, pointed out that “it is not so much a
matter of fact whether there are or not non-Western
aesthetics as it is a pragmatic decision whether such a thing is
desirable and worth constructing.” So to say that “nonWestern aesthetics” exists is not so much to recognize that it
is present and to describe it but to express a choice and to
posit such choice as desirable. This pragmatist position, in my
view, is also an evaluative statement. It is a statement about
what ought to be in the light of what one decides is desirable
for society. And the questions of who decides, why and how
one decides are overlooked for the benefit of the question of
what is desirable for society—the only question that seems to
deserve consideration.
It is helpful to note that such a pragmatist concern has been
voiced in critical race theory. For instance, in the context of
the epistemologies of ignorance, Harvey Cormier argues that
given that all truths are creations of human beings attempting
to satisfy their desires, instead of focusing on the dichotomy
between racist reality and racist beliefs, critical theorists
should focus on the struggle to achieve an anti-racist society
positing that such a society is desirable and worth
constructing. [22] By the same token, it can be argued that in
a postcolonial, multicultural world, non-Western postcolonial
aesthetics is desirable. But what makes a postcolonial
multicultural world a world of intrinsic value? Would the mere
construction of non-Western aesthetics be desirable? Would
any construction be acceptable? What would the parameters
be and who would decide what they would be? Wouldn’t such
construction allow for the reproduction of the unsatisfactory
Manichean allegory? It seems that the pragmatist approach
would satisfy the justification of the construction of nonWestern aesthetics but would leave unresolved the question of
the nature of the construction itself. Indeed, it does not follow
from the decision that the construction of the object “nonWestern aesthetics” is desirable that there will be agreement
on or even clear understanding of what that object is to be, or
what the best construction would be.
As I mentioned earlier, non-Western aesthetics as a colonial
invention was informed by a racist order that made nonWestern aesthetics the Other of Western aesthetics, that is,
what (Western) aesthetics was not. The notion of “nonWestern” suggested an essentialist—racialist if not racist—
division of the world population and a significant difference, if
not a necessary hierarchy between Western and non-Western
aesthetics. This is one reason why the translation from one
framework to another has been regarded as remarkably
difficult. As Blocker noted,
This [‘any discussion of non-Western aesthetics
initiated from within Western aesthetics’] is
therefore basically a problem of translation, but
what we might call ‘deep translation,’ where we
are not just looking for equivalences (or near
equivalences) among words of different languages
for the same concept, but where it is not at all
clear that there is a shared concept in the first
place. [23]

In his account, the two entities are so fundamentally different
that it becomes difficult to find correspondences between
them given the lack of a shared concept, and nothing seems
to be able to reconcile two inherently different systems of
beliefs or of truth creation. If that is the case then it seems
difficult to make any empirical statement about non-Western
aesthetics; it will be arduous to state matters of facts about
non-Western aesthetics given the problem of deep translation.
And so we are left with the only possibility of making
assertions of value pertaining to the desirability of nonWestern aesthetics to postcolonial multicultural societies. But
such a construction does not guarantee a nonracist,
nonessentialist division of the world and certainly does not
attempt to truly connect Western and non-Western aesthetics,
given the assumed incommunicability. I see a significant
difficulty associated with the pragmatic answer. On this view,
the statement about non-Western aesthetics will become
nothing but an evaluative statement which in turn depends on
an empirical statement about the state of most societies in the
world today, a statement that describes them as postcolonial
and multicultural. But how postcolonial and multicultural our
societies are today is not only a matter of reality and truth of
existence—today’s societies are societies where
multiculturalism and postcolonialism obtain—it is also a matter
of choice—the decision to adhere to the value of such society
and make it a goal of various policies. As a result, the
evaluative claim about non-Western aesthetics may ultimately
appear as a hybrid assertion of values and facts. Ultimately,
despite the difficulty of “deep translation” and the strong
justification for the construction of non-Western aesthetics,
and perhaps because of the difficulties associated with
‘inventing’ non-Western aesthetics, attempts at translating are
still very much in order.
Blocker emphasizes that translating non-Western aesthetic
frameworks presents advantages and inconveniences:
On the plus side, these thought systems [of nonWestern aesthetics] are able to enter, as they
otherwise could not, the mainstream of
international aesthetics discussion. On the
negative side, much of the integrity of the
original thought may be lost. For such a
translation to succeed it must clearly be a
cooperative effort among Western-trained and
non-Western scholars. Nonetheless, insofar as it
is Western scholars who initiate the discussion
and into whose system non-Western thought is
translated, it remains a Western construction and
invention. [24]
I take issue with the idea that the result of this discussion is
yet another Western invention. It certainly could be the case,
but I would disagree that it is. Perhaps the difficulty resides in
the idea of translation itself. Blocker describes a process of
rendering contents from one thought system to another
system through some rule of replacement. But it seems to me
that one can imagine a different result if the process is a
process of expressing rather than translating and if it involves
understanding. When there may be loss in translation it is very
likely that gain will come from understanding. I am not

arguing that this “understanding” will necessarily be complete
or that the expression of such understanding will necessarily
be free of misinterpretations but at least it requires a
discussion of the narrativity of meaning and a consideration of
power dynamics—power to acknowledge, and to give or to
limit access to a given non-Western aesthetics within
international discussions. In the end, the object may appear
foreign to a given framework but may very well be
understandable; it could induce changes in both systems of
thought but this requires a commitment to value pluralism.
[25] In Blocker’s account, gains and losses are regarded as
pertaining to non-Western aesthetics only since they will gain
access to the “mainstream of international aesthetics” and
may lose “integrity.”
But the question of what is there for Western aesthetics to
gain and to lose remains unanswered or even unconsidered
and I would argue that as long as this will be the case, what is
at issue remains a strict translation decided by Western
scholars that does not require cooperative effort. A collective
effort even if it concerns a translation requires an exchange
leading to some agreement about the validity and correlative
authority of the result. Blocker’s translation does not suggest
any attempt at agreeing on the terms of the translation, or any
discussion of what the translation would look like. Under such
auspices the final product simply restates a hierarchical order
where Western scholars decide how to translate non-Western
aesthetics thought system and where they risk “los[ing] the
integrity of the original thought” while pretend[ing] to open
the international aesthetics scene to non-Western aesthetics. I
subscribe to Blocker’s idea of a collective effort but I see it as
a prospective claim not as a descriptive one, and a fortiori not
necessarily realized when Western scholars encounter nonWestern aesthetics. A further point that I find troublesome in
Blocker’s view is the idea that it is necessarily the Western
scholar or Western-trained scholar who will ‘initiate’ the
discussion.
I would not claim that it does not often appear that way—as in
the case of Césaire and Breton that I shall discuss in the next
section—but I want to examine and discuss what qualifies as
initiation. I must say that in my view the context of the
discussion is as important as (if not more important than) the
identity of the initiator. Why is the discussion to be framed on
a binary model as an encounter between Western and nonWestern aesthetics? Why can’t we think of a discussion that
would recognize pluralism in aesthetics and would include the
possibility of a discussion among types of non-Western
aesthetics? Considering the diversity of non-Western
aesthetics (Native Indian, Indian, African-American, Caribbean,
African and so on) how can the equality of treatment among
translations and among discussions be insured? It may well be
that the invention of non-Western aesthetics is desirable in
multicultural societies but it is my contention that such an
invention is far from a sufficient condition for a real equality of
treatment. These inventions can undoubtedly be racialized, if
not racist, and will not guarantee any movement toward
nonracist societies. The pragmatist goal discussed earlier is
not satisfactory unless normative concerns are seriously
considered. It is required that the invention becomes more
than just another Western invention; that non-Western

frameworks contribute to redefining Western aesthetics and
aesthetics in general; that Western aesthetics be also an
object of translation by others, that Western aesthetics be also
conceived as another.
I will now turn to examining the relations between Césaire’s
Negritude—through some of his writings and interviews—and
Surrealist aesthetics—through Breton’s work—as an example
of the interplay of race and Western/non-Western aesthetics.
In my view, the exchange between the two men is an attempt
at understanding what they have in common once they both
recognize a common ground, and does not simply result in
another Western invention.
3. A Case Study: Césaire’s Negritude and Surrealist
Aesthetics
“My Negritude is not a stone, its deafness dashed
against
the clamor of the day
my Negritude is not an opaque spot of dead
water
on the dead eye of the earth
my Negritude is neither a tower nor a cathedral
it plunges into the red flesh of the soil
it plunges into the ardent flesh of the sky
it pierces opaque prostration with its upright
patience”
Aimé Césaire, Notebook of a Return to the Native
Land
I must first explain why I single out Césaire and Breton when
both men belong to movements that other members
contributed to define. Indeed Negritude was a collective
movement that included Léon-Gontran Damas and Léopold
Sédar Senghor and Surrealism was a collective enterprise that
included, among others, Louis Aragon, Paul Eluard, Antonin
Artaud, Joan Miro, and Salvador Dali. I believe that there are
several forms of Negritude. Both Damas’s negritude and
Senghor’s negritude undoubtedly present their own sets of
particularities and deserve analysis. Nevertheless I limit my
investigation here to Césaire because I seek to carefully
examine both the literary encounter between Negritude and
Surrealism and the encounters between Césaire and Breton as
colonial subjects. [26] I am interested in surrealism as an
aesthetic-political movement—as explicitly described by Breton
—a movement that emphasizes the critical and imaginative
powers of consciousness.
Breton provided a brief report of his very first encounter with
Césaire. [27] In 1941, on his way to New York to escape the
Vichy regime in France, Breton made a stop in Martinique and
discovered, by accident, a copy of the first issue of the journal
Tropiques that Césaire, his wife Suzanne, and René Ménil, had
just launched. Immediately impressed by the writings he asked
to meet with the author and met Césaire the following

morning. Obviously Breton solicited the meeting with Césaire
so it could easily be argued that he initiated the discussion. As
obvious as this may seem, I will defend the position that the
discussion started with Césaire’s writings capturing Breton’s
attention. In other words, in my view, the discussion starts
with the encounter with a thought-provoking object. Césaire
did not conceive of this encounter as initiated by Breton.
Asked in 1969 to describe his encounter with Breton and to
explain whether or not he thought he was then unwittingly
surrealist, Césaire replied: “I knew very little about surrealism
but I must say that my research was leading to the same
direction and when I met Breton—and surrealism, it was not
so much a discovery for me, it was more of a justification.
There was a complete convergence between the surrealist
research and mine; in other words it confirmed me and made
me bolder.” [28] I think that what Césaire meant was that it
was not a discovery in the sense that he was not obtaining
knowledge of surrealism for the first time, although he knew
very little about it. This encounter was a justification to the
extent that Césaire was shown to be right in that he was
presented with additional reasons to proceed as he was
already doing. It is reasonable to believe that for Breton it was
not a discovery either and that it was also some type of
justification or recognition that prompted him to meet with
Césaire.
For Césaire this encounter was a process of coming together
from different origins. In another interview he emphasized that
for him Surrealism was more a technique than anything else.
Identity was the focus of his inquiry since, as he put it, he was
incessantly seeking the “fundamental Negro.” His concern with
Africa and what he called his “Negro being” was never
defeated by his interest in Surrealism. Therefore, in my view,
Césaire was never a disciple of surrealism and there was no
“period of discipleship” even in the strictest sense elaborated
by Daniel Scott who discusses the encounter. [29] Césaire was
fascinated by Breton’s personality but he saw a danger in the
apparent universalism of Surrealism and considered it in
relation to his identity—what he sometimes called his
“particularism.” As a result, he feared becoming a disciple [30]
and consented to use surrealism as a weapon only to remain
true to negritude. The following quotation emphasizes this
point. “And then there was my encounter with Breton and the
crush. But keep in mind that I owe my first true revelation to
Senghor. He brought me a continent, Africa. It was fantastic
since for an Antillean Africa had always been occulted.” [31]
Breton, however, recognized in Césaire a “great Black poet”
and regarded the notebook as “the biggest lyrical monument”
of his time. [32] He found it necessary to insist both on
Césaire’s blackness and on his humanity. “And it is a Black
who guides us today into the unexplored…And it is a Black
who is not only a Black but all men, who expresses all
interrogations, all distresses, all hopes and all ecstasies and
who will become more and more who I regard as the
prototype of humanity.” [33]
It seems obvious that racial considerations were part of the
encounter, given both Breton’s categorization of Césaire as a
“great Black poet” and Césaire’s affirmed commitment to
negritude and the latter’s determination to make surrealism
only a tool at its service. But how exactly does race play a role

in this encounter and in the recognition that follows? Should
Césaire’s commitment to negritude be regarded as a
commitment to himself, to his culture or to his race? Lastly,
what does this encounter tell us about the links between
aesthetics and otherness and how does race matter in
rethinking these links?
Surely it can be argued that the compliment “a great Black
poet” echoes the racial prejudice of the time, which would
make Breton determined by his epoch. But I argue that there
is more to it. Not only is Césaire described as a Black poet but
he is categorized as a “guide to the unexplored”; he is
therefore regarded as a depositary who has the power to
initiate others by leading the way. Breton also says that this
particular Black man exemplifies all men and expresses their
hopes and anxieties. In Breton’s view Césaire’s particularism is
compatible with universality to the point that he could become
a prototype of humanity, someone who exhibits the essential
features of what humanity is becoming. Breton creates
connections between particularism and universalism, between
Césaire’s racial identity and his poetry, between Negritude and
Surrealist aesthetics seen as universal. Breton is not simply
attempting to translate one framework into the other; he
expresses his understanding of Césaire’s aesthetics in relation
to Surrealism. The frameworks of Negritude and Surrealism
become related to each other. I do not intend to describe an
idealization here; certainly Breton’s reading of Césaire’s work
is determined by what he regards as universal, namely,
Western aesthetics in general and surrealism in particular.
However, while he is asserting meaning from his Western
location and while part of Césaire’s original thought may be
misunderstood and lost—with the possibility of being
recaptured later, surrealism does not remain untouched.
Is this understanding (of surrealism from a negritude
perspective and of negritude from a surrealist perspective) a
mere result of the encounter or does it require intent on
Breton’s part? If we were to conclude that there must be
intent on Breton’s part—and not on Césaire’s part—we may
have to conclude that indeed the Western aesthetics
scholar/artist, in this case Breton, is the initiator of the
discussion. Trying to determine Breton’s intent with certainty
is likely to be a vain attempt but one can certainly examine
the broader project of Surrealist aesthetics to find out the
possible links between Surrealism and otherness and
illuminate how this relation is exemplified by Breton’s
encounter with Césaire while unquestionably shaped by race.
According to Scott, the underlining project of Surrealism is
marked by the idea of conquest. He argues that:
As part of the dominating European ideology of
racial difference and cultural superiority derived
from the era of imperialism expansion and
anthropological/archaeological inquiry, surrealism
must be examined for its own collusion in the
colonial enterprise. In fact, it practices—in its
limitation and celebration of Other—an aesthetics
founded on European constructions of the
primitive and the marvelous which place the
movement in a contradictory position vis-à-vis

the Other it so often celebrated.” [34]
On this reading, Surrealism ought to be examined within the
larger colonial project. If Scott is right, the encounter between
Césaire and Breton can and perhaps must be regarded as a
colonial encounter. The encounter between the founder of
surrealism and Césaire’s writings would then be an encounter
of Western aesthetics encountering with otherness. In my view
there are other forces mediated by race that need to be
considered, and with this in mind I will examine Scott’s claims
carefully.
Scott argues first that “the relationship between Césaire and
Breton can be considered as a product of the dominating
European ideology of cultural acquisition and second that the
acquisitiveness can precipitate a process of inspiration,
imitation, rejection, and innovation that enriches Surrealism,
its contexts, and postcolonial writings since Césaire.” [35] I
will argue that the first claim is more complex than it appears
if the function of race is taken as seriously as it should be, and
that the second is challenged when race is regarded as a key
element of this relationship.
Why is the encounter a product of the “dominating European
ideology of cultural acquisition” and how much of a product is
it? Surely the encounter between Césaire and Breton can be
regarded as made possible by the set of conditions put in
place by Western colonialism; indeed in 1941 the status of
Martinique was unequivocally that of a French colony. [36] By
the same token, there is little controversy as to whether or not
this colonial structure was justified by a “dominating European
ideology.” However, it is more difficult to make this
dominating ideology or the idea of a de facto colonial subject a
sufficient condition for not only the encounter but also the
discussion between Césaire and Breton. It does not follow
from the existence of a dominating European ideology that the
encounter ought to be only a product of this ideology. In my
view the encounter is complicated by Césaire’s own strategy
and the Manichean prism cannot satisfactorily account for it. It
is precisely the intricacy of the encounter that makes possible
the “inspiration, imitation, rejection and innovation” mentioned
by Scott that “enriches [both] Surrealism and postcolonial
writings since Césaire.”
As Breton stated in the manifestoes, Surrealism seeks to arrive
at a “mental vantage-point from which life and death, the real
and the imaginary, past and future, communicable and
incommunicable, high and low, will no longer be perceived as
contradictions.” [37] One can see why this approach would be
appealing to Césaire whose objective was to escape from the
exclusionary nature of Western thought and Western reason
and to reconcile with African culture. In this sense Césaire
found confirmation—rather than revelation—in Surrealism,
which proposes a framework where exclusive binaries are
questioned and where the reign of the Western rational logic is
not considered the only truth. Surrealism could be a tool for
Césaire. But Césaire did not become a disciple, and I disagree
with Scott here. Although Césaire regarded Surrealism as a
liberating factor he was not simply a follower. There was
perhaps something fascinating to him about identifying
common references between Surrealist thinking and his own

thinking and to find what he regarded as a significant tool to
challenge the French language—the language that in his
experience was used to exclude other discourses and
experiences and that he will use to make these experiences
visible—but at no point did Césaire depart from his own
project.
Encountering Surrealism was for Césaire the confirmation that
Western rationalism could be and needed to be scrutinized; it
was not the discovery of potential reasons for a revolt against
Western rationalism. And although Scott is right to point out
that Césaire’s Negritude and Breton’s Surrealism conceived of
the possibilities of moving beyond the binaries from very
different standpoints it is important to remember that this is
precisely what the idea of convergence implies. To emphasize
the idea of convergence is not to deny that the surrealist idea
of support for oppressed and primitive people was compatible
with the idea of conquest and could provide a justification for
defining these people as eminently foreign and for dominating
them by imposing structures of liberation on them. But if
Surrealism does not account for any agency on the part of the
colonized it does not follow that the colonized cannot manifest
such agency.
I want to suggest that the fact that the encounter generates
changes for both Césaire and Breton is a sign that this
encounter cannot be limited to an act of conquest. There was
indeed gain on both sides but these gains were not victories
per se in the sense that neither gained mastery over the
other. Negritude remains different from Surrealism and vice
versa, while both gained from the encounter and as a result
changed. There is for Césaire the recognition of a tool that he
can use to his own purpose and for Breton the recognition of
something familiar and yet not the same. The encounter
remains an encounter with the Other and it is mediated by
race in the context of colonial, imperialist, and racial ideology.
I want to suggest that encountering is not limited to meeting
the Other as an adversary. It can also capture an act of
coming together, an act of converging, and it is of special
interest to consider this possibility in the context of
colonialism. Indeed encountering the Other is a complex
moment that makes invention possible along with mimicking
and rejection. Certainly part of the process must be considered
in relation to the “European ideology of cultural acquisition,”
but the multiple aspects of the process including mimicry,
rejection, and invention do not result only from unilateral
“acquisitiveness,” but also from exchange and from a
collective effort to understand and this is why Scott’s second
claim can be challenged.
Finally, how does race help rethink the links between
aesthetics and otherness? In my view, the current order of
international aesthetics discussions is best understood if
regarded as a racial order in a sense close to what María
Lugones called “racial state.” [38] According to Lugones, in the
“racial state” no subject escapes the racial ideologies and there
exist two different kinds of subjects—unmarked and marked
racial subjects—namely “oppressed” and “oppressors.”
However, as Lugones insists, the oppressed are not simply
victims, there is always agency and resistance on the part of
the racially marked subjects:

My sense is that one of the factors that makes
oppression inescapable in many theories that
portray oppression as inescapable is the inability
to form liberatory syllogism in the world of the
oppressor given the logic of oppression. … So the
connection between the practical syllogism,
ontological plurality, and liberatory oppression
theory resides in the fact that the oppressed
know themselves in realities in which they are
able to form intentions that are not among the
alternatives that are possible in the world in
which they are brutalized and oppressed.” [39]
Lugones rightly emphasizes the idea of a norm, of a default
position—in this case whiteness—which corresponds with the
unmarked category, the non-racial category. In this reading,
race is usually only specified when it is nonwhite although it is
not necessarily named as such. Race operates within a system
of binary oppositions and ideas about race determine
hierarchies within this structure.
As the lover of purity, the impartial reasoner is
outside history, outside culture. He occupies the
privileged vantage point with others like him, all
characterized by the ‘possession’ of reason. All
occupants of this vantage point are homogeneous
in their ability to comprehend and communicate.
So ‘culture’ which marks radical differences in
conceptions of people and things, cannot be
something they have. They are instead
‘postcultural’ or ‘culturally transparent.’ [40]
As the “racial state” classifies people according to physical
characteristics, racial and racialized aesthetics classify art and
artistic conceptions according to cultural characteristics.
Indeed, to believe that non-Western aesthetic thought and
frameworks are radically different—so different that it is a
matter of “deep translation”—or that translation is
unattainable, is to mark other aesthetics as culturally different
while having Western aesthetics escape the mark of culture.
These classifications are not overtly associated with race but I
believe that they are about race.
Likewise the binary between Western and non-Western
aesthetics expresses a hierarchy and distinguishes between
peoples and between cultures on the basis of racial signifiers.
Here the default position is “Western.” It is the unmarked
category; aesthetics is Western aesthetics and vice versa, and
the qualifier is added mainly to specify what is non-Western,
what requires translation to be accessible. The hierarchy
within international aesthetics discussion is determined by race
but is not explicitly formulated in such terms.
So whether the crucial danger is the unawareness of one’s
position within the racial state, as Lugones argues, or the
unawareness of forms of racism, as Gloria Yamato claims, [41]
everyone is a subject within the structure of the racial state.
We must identify the pretension to universality, comprehended
as an unmarked racial category, as precisely a sign of the
racial state if we are to work against the construction of racial
inequalities.

Aesthetic concepts are created along with racial constructions.
These concepts ultimately exclude works of art and
conceptions of aesthetics that do not fit Western norms or do
not seem to be possibly translated into such norms, which are
defined arbitrarily but are regarded as natural. On my reading,
the failure to recognize the pervasiveness of racial categories
in aesthetics and in other disciplines is a main obstacle to the
construction of any form of relationality. How a certain
discourse on cosmopolitanism can produce such unawareness
and amount to a failure to recognize the ordinariness of
racial(ized) aesthetic categories is what I shall now examine.
4. Aesthetics, Cosmopolitanism, Relationality: Why Does
Race Still Matter?
Thought of the Other is the moral generosity
disposing me to accept the principle of alterity…,
but [it] can dwell within me…without ‘prizing me
open,” without changing me within myself. As an
ethical principle, it is enough that I not violate it.
The other of Thought is precisely this altering.
Then I have to act [and] change my thought….I
change, and I exchange. This is an aesthetics of
turbulence whose corresponding ethics is not
provided in advance.
Edouard Glissant, Poetics, 154-55
In what follows I seek to show that today’s global context
often referred to as “transnational” or “cosmopolitan” is not
inconsistent with the pervasiveness of racial categories in
politics of culture. I will then argue that a relational order that
would allow for unprejudiced politics of culture and aesthetics
is still to be invented and that rethinking aesthetics through
race is a critical step towards this achievement.
The term 'cosmopolitanism' has come to appear more
satisfactory than the term globalization which refers primarily
to marketing strategies. Laudatory analysis of globalization
has been challenged on the basis of evidence of extreme
forms of inequalities generated by processes of
globalization.[42] Cosmopolitanism, to the contrary, has been
regarded as encompassing obligations to strangers—on the
basis of a shared world citizenship—and a genuine interest in
practices and beliefs that have significance to them. [43] But
cosmopolitanism is not immune to hierarchy or inequality. The
absence of state boundaries can also create privileges. Indeed,
feminist scholarship has emphasized some of the possible
consequences of the absence of boundaries, such as a lack of
duty, which creates power, generates an ability to see or not
see, to recognize or not to recognize, and moreover, to see
and not be seen [44] or, I would add, to recognize and not
have to be recognized. Another questionable aspect of
cosmopolitanism is that it is not exempt from marketing
concerns; capital itself can become more and more
cosmopolitan. [45] In that respect it seems fair to say that
“there is a sense in which cosmopolitanism is the name not of
a solution but of a challenge.” [46]
The moral credentials of cosmopolitanism have been rightly
questioned and it is critical to clarify current configurations of

power and to carefully examine the motivations and
consequences of its implicit classification of populations. States
have not become irrelevant and nation-states along with
multicultural states continue to define and regulate
populations, practices, and beliefs. National standards of
aesthetics and international aesthetic discussions constitute
examples of how populations, aesthetic practices, and beliefs
can be classified and consequently included or excluded. When
classified as “impossible to translate” or as “non-Western
aesthetics translated,” the aesthetics that are not Western or
not Westernized are de facto excluded from international
discussion and this exclusion varies in degrees. In a
cosmopolitan and multicultural world it seems undoubtedly
desirable to have exchanges among various aesthetic
frameworks and to regard them as equal. But this is far from
everyday practices and the irony is that cosmopolitanism can
contribute to the pervasiveness of racialized categories by
promoting the false idea of genuine interest in strangers’
beliefs and conditions.
Even if we resist the reduction of cosmopolitanism to the
privilege of a person who is in a position to claim to be a
“‘citizen of the world’ by virtue of independent means, hightech tastes, and globe-trotting ability,” [47] we still have to
acknowledge that the sense of being a citizen of the world
does not necessarily translate into a strong sense of
obligations towards strangers or a genuine interest in their
practices and beliefs. Despite its promises, the era of
cosmopolitanism remains an era of privilege, exclusion, and
racialization of subjects. In my view, at the center of
cosmopolitanism resides the question of the location of power
and privilege, and of the power to define, to represent and
regulate others/strangers along with their practices and
beliefs. The idea that the power of national boundaries is
declining should not hide the reaffirmation of boundaries
determined by membership that goes beyond the nation and
marks differences such as colonialism and imperialism. On that
reading the world today is a place where most citizens have to
cross “colonial and imperial differences” to use Mignolo’s
phrase. [48] Colonial and imperial differences constitute
boundaries that reveal that strangers’ beliefs and practices are
not necessarily taken seriously and that obligations are not
extended to all strangers equally which make relationality or
any form of dialogic bond extremely difficult, if not impossible.
The world of aesthetics is not immune to these boundaries
symbolizing difference and in aesthetics as elsewhere there is
always the potential for difference to become a proxy for
inequality.
A main objection to my view would be that—as a body of
scholarship emphasizes— there are ways in which individuals
and communities challenge and successfully weaken the
hegemony of the global political economy and the cultural
marketplace. On that account individuals are, or can be, actors
in global processes that will ultimately benefit them. I would
respond that while it is true that individuals, families, and
communities attempt to create new boundaries for themselves
in the contemporary era and sometimes succeed, it is also true
that older parameters through which difference has been
characterized resurface to reactivate racial and ethnic
hierarchies. Hierarchies of power and knowledge certainly

change over time, but they remain influenced by the legacy of
earlier periods.
Despite cosmopolitan optimism in the present world, relations
of authority continue to be defined along racial lines that still
determine the construction of signifier and signified. As I
stated earlier, transnationalism is about geopolitical power
differentials where race, along with gender and class, function
as powerful categories. The world of aesthetics does not
escape the risks associated with the praise of
cosmopolitanism, namely a hidden lack of responsibility, a lack
of obligations towards strangers, a lack of genuine interest in
strangers’ practices and beliefs, and exclusions on the basis of
racialized colonial and imperial differences, or what is
perceived as such. A dialogue is much needed and it requires
relationality or reciprocal exchange over and above translation.
Before explaining what I mean by relationality and why I think
it is desirable, I need to exemplify how the world of aesthetics
is affected by racialized differences. In the second section of
this paper I showed how Breton’s surrealism in its relation with
Césaire’s negritude was an example of a colonial encounter
that manifested more than the expected dualism Westernnon-Western, namely a discussion and a strategy of resistance
on Césaire’s part. I now want to turn more generally to the
discussion of Black/African/Africana aesthetics.
Examining key aesthetic concepts in Yoruba culture, Rowland
Abiodun argues:
The study of African art having begun within the
discipline of anthropology, inherited some
pertinent and vexing questions, among which is
the false assumption that Western scholars can
fully understand and interpret the cultures of
other peoples by using only Western cultural
notions, values and standards–a claim that
cannot be divorced from Western imperialistic
involvement in Africa. [49]
However, the demarcation line between what ought to be used
to interpret and understand is far from being easy to draw and
Abiodun insists here on historicism. He notes that: “While it
may have been useful to utilize only Western theoretical
paradigms in the study of African art history and aesthetics
early in the twentieth century, it has now become imperative
to search carefully within the African cultures in which the art
forms originate, and to use internally derived conceptual
frameworks in any critical discourse on African Art.” In other
words, using a Western theoretical framework may have been
a lesser evil, and Abiodun suggests that it is now time to refer
to an authentic African conceptual framework. He calls for a
new methodology in the study of African aesthetics or of the
aesthetics of African art. As he puts it:
[t]he recognition of how important African
languages and literatures are to the
understanding of African Art will lead to a
reconsideration of a number of ‘closed’ issues,
theoretical frameworks, and artistic concepts; a
redefinition of much terminology; and a
reappraisal of the present style and techniques of

displaying African art objects in museums and
exhibition halls. [50]
The difficulty here again seems to reside in the translation of
such a theoretical stance into practice and in the translation of
one conceptual framework into another. But perhaps
translation can’t be satisfying and is not required; perhaps
relationality is more satisfying to the extent that it requires
reciprocal understanding or at least recognition of different
understandings and the possibility of exchanges on the
construction of meanings. Relationality would make it possible
to transcend inequality, hierarchy, and cultural imperialism, to
the extent that it allows multiplicity. But relationality needs
first to be regarded as possible. This imperative demands that
we rethink the dichotomies, question power and privilege,
analyze dualism to promote what is at the intersection of these
various worlds, as well as what is far from the point of contact
or point of convergence. A frontier or a boundary is obviously
what separates, what indicates the limits of a territory; it is a
line of division between opposites or different things but it is
also the zone where two different entities meet. As a result,
the demarcation both affirms the difference and manifests the
point of encounter. In aesthetics this demarcation between
Western aesthetics and non-Western aesthetics—on the basis
of arbitrary norms of aesthetics standards regarded as
universal—has been used to reinforce the frontier between
what have been regarded as two necessary opposites. As
Warren D’Azevedo puts it: “The apparent absence of these
factors [i.e., formal aesthetic standards], as well as the lack of
clearly explicated concepts equivalent to art or aesthetics in
most non-Western cultures, has caused us to suspect that the
expression of artistry may be somehow fundamentally different
from our own.” [51]
Here again the focus is on the ability to translate, not so much
to communicate, to concentrate on making an object that is
judged to be fundamentally different somehow recognizable by
one’s own framework and to create a possible fit in accordance
with one’s own categories and standards. As I stated earlier,
the focus on translation is misleading, as is the idea of
translation. What matters is the possibility of expression and
communication, of exchanging ideas about aesthetics that
maybe different. But this attitude requires transcending the
barriers of colonialism and imperialism. It requires that “those
who possess both power and the categorical eye,” to use
Lugones’s phrase, [52] take note that various forms of
resistance are at play, and that the Manichean allegory might
no longer be very useful. Lugones’s mestizaje as a metaphor
for impurity and resistance is very helpful in understanding the
multiplicity of social beings. The concept of mestizaje permits
the identification of norms that pretend to be universal by
attempting to separate in pure parts and it ultimately makes
classifications impossible. Lugones writes: “[When I think of
mestizaje] … I think of the attempt at control exercised by
those who possess both power and the categorical eye and
who attempt to split everything impure, breaking it down into
pure elements (as in egg white and egg yolk) for the purpose
of control. Control over creativity.” [53]
While resistance is required precisely because of the power of
the “categorical eye,” such resistance can remain unseen by

the “categorical eye” precisely because it has the power to
decide what must be seen or not. Given the distinction
between Western and non-Western aesthetics where Western
aesthetics is the unmarked category, to think seriously about
an antiracist order is not only to be aware of the forms of
racism but also to recognize that the norm is only one of the
many possible forms of aesthetics. It has been argued that in
a cosmopolitan multicultural world it is desirable to have nonWestern aesthetics. I would suggest that it is crucial to stop
regarding Western aesthetics as central and other aesthetics
as peripheral. It is essential that Western aesthetics looks at
itself as another namely the other of non-Western aesthetics.
5. Conclusion
Aesthetics, I hope to have shown, would benefit from
integrating race as a constant element of analysis at least as
long as the desirable antiracist world order has not been
realized. Despite the universal pretension of aesthetic
standards it remains an open question whether aesthetics as a
discipline can encompass a serious examination of the
influence of race and an analysis of the application of racial
meaning to (foreign) aesthetics practices and beliefs. Care
must be taken in differentiating between two different periods
and two different strategies of exclusion. The earlier period
concerns the aesthetics of race and racism and scholarship has
focused on exhibiting or countering scientific racism and
racialism. Today, in the era of cosmopolitanism,
transnationalism, and new racialism, the task is to establish
that a lack of boundaries and recognized differences can also
constitute occasions to create and attribute a new racial status
to individuals, community, practices, and beliefs. Politics of
culture often convert into politics of marginalization and politics
of oppression on the basis of difference transformed into
inequality and dominance validated by a nonbiological
conception of race.
My goal in this essay has therefore been to explore the links
between aesthetics and race through the lenses of the
accepted distinctions between the Western and non-Western,
the colonial and postcolonial, the national and transnational. I
have attempted to describe for further reflection the strengths
and the weaknesses of a discourse that looks upon nonWestern aesthetics as a colonial invention as well as the
pragmatist concern attached to the belief that it is indeed
desirable in multicultural societies to have and therefore
construct non-Western aesthetics. I have also sought to
highlight the difficulties of a historicist approach that defines a
period where the Western aesthetic framework was useful to
understanding non-Western aesthetics as opposed to a time
where it is no longer useful. My aim has been to suggest ways
in which thinking about race and racialization can help thinking
about aesthetics in relation to postcolonial and global
concerns.
In my view, the way forward lies in defining aesthetics in a
way that progressively includes non-Western aesthetics and in
encouraging dialogues between structures rather than divides
between Western and non-Western aesthetics. My project is
not an ideal one and I believe that tensions and conflicts will
necessarily arise. What is expected here is not a total

disappearance of relations of authority between worlds of
aesthetics but rather a strong recognition of the power
dynamics leading to an empowerment of non-Western
aesthetics through increasing development of transformative
knowledge. And as I argued, I do not believe this to be yet
another Western invention. Change will be made possible by
the various forms of resistance of non-Western aesthetics and
will undoubtedly reveal negotiations between structure and
agency. As Frederick Douglass put it “[p]ower concedes
nothing without a demand. It never did, and it never will.”
[54]
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